----- Original Message -----
From: "Frank Conlon" <
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To: <
H-ASIA@H-NET.MSU.EDU>
Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2012 11:45 PM
Subject: H-ASIA: AJISS-Commentary No.167 on Japan's general election by
Katsuyuki Yakushiji
> H-ASIA
> December 13, 2012
>
> AJISS-Commentary No.167 on Japan's general election by Katsuyuki Yakushiji
> ***********************************************************************
> From: Japan Institute of International Affairs <
e-commentary@jiia.or.jp>
>
> Editor: Akio Watanabe
> Editorial Board: Hideki Asari, Masashi Nishihara, and Taizo Yakushiji
> Online Publisher: Yoshiji Nogami
>
> AJISS-Commentary No.167
> "The Future of Japanese Domestic Politics and Japan's Path Ahead" by
> Katsuyuki Yakushiji
>
> [Prof. Katsuyuki Yakushiji teaches at Toyo University. He is also an
> adjunct fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
> The views expressed in this piece are the author's own and should not be
> attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic
> Studies.]
>
>
http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary/201212/13-1.html
>
> Several times a year the Japanese Diet holds a party leaders' debate
> modeled on the UK's "Question Time." Each occasion sees the prime minister
> and the leaders of the opposition parties exchanging criticisms amidst
> loud heckling from onlooking MPs. It has become a ritual that does nothing
> but waste time. The party leaders' debate of November 14, however, was
> different. As planned, Shinzo Abe, President of the Liberal Democratic
> Party (LDP), called for an early dissolution of the House of
> Representatives by Prime Minister (and head of the Democratic Party of
> Japan [DPJ]) Yoshihiko Noda. Everyone had expected the prime minister to
> offer some vague justification for postponing the dissolution. Instead,
> Prime Minister Noda proposed reducing the number of seats in the National
> Diet and then bluntly added, "Let?s just cut to the chase. We will
> dissolve the Diet on the 16th."
>
> In an instant the heckling stopped and the committee chamber became
> hushed. Never had a prime minister announced a specific date for
> dissolution in a statement to the Diet. The opposition members were
> naturally flummoxed, as indeed was the ruling party leadership. Abe was
> unable to hide his shock, and his subsequent remarks trailed off into
> meaninglessness.
>
> The Japanese media conduct frequent public opinion polls. The latest poll
> shows support for the Noda administration down to about 20% and that for
> the DPJ in the low teens, less than half that for the LDP. If this holds
> true into the general elections, the DPJ will seemingly suffer a major
> defeat as the LDP reclaims power as the dominant party. No Diet member
> welcomes an election in which he/she is certain of a loss. There was
> overwhelming opposition to dissolution and general elections within the
> DPJ, of course, and Prime Minister Noda had been expected to hold off
> dissolving the Diet until next year.
>
> Turning the opposition parties' demands for an early dissolution against
> them, though, Prime Minister Noda countered by insisting on conditions
> such as a reduction in the number of Diet seats as he announced the
> dissolution. It was colorful turnabout theater. Many of the viewers
> watching the party leaders? debate on television began rethinking their
> assessments of Prime Minister Noda's leadership ability, and some of them
> may even switch their support to the DPJ. This is how effective the
> "bombshell" was.
>
> There are undoubtedly several reasons for the prime minister's
> determination to dissolve the Diet before year's end.
>
> Since becoming prime minister in autumn of last year, Noda has been
> primarily focused on raising the consumption tax. Japan has a cumulative
> debt of approximately 1000 trillion yen, more than twice its GDP. This is
> far greater even that European countries such as Greece and Italy who have
> been thrown into fiscal crisis. Should its profligate public spending
> continue unabated, Japan will ultimately find itself confronting the
> specter of fiscal collapse. An increase in the consumption tax was
> essential to avoid this.
>
> A bill to increase the consumption tax was passed in August. The tax rate
> is to be raised in two stages, from the present 5% to 8% in April 2014 and
> then to 10% in October 2015. This rise is not set in stone but rather
> conditioned on "an upturn in economic conditions." The Japanese economy
> remains sluggish, and additional appropriations for economic stimulus
> measures and smooth implementation of the fiscal 2013 budget will be
> necessary to satisfy this condition. If dissolution is postponed, however,
> resistance from the opposition parties will become fiercer, budget
> deliberations will stall, and ultimately the consumption tax rate may not
> be raised. To ensure trouble-free implementation of economic stimulus
> measures and an increase in the consumption tax, Prime Minister Noda has
> committed to dissolution and general elections in which he faces a strong
> likelihood of losing power.
>
> He also appears set on rebuilding the DPJ. The DPJ secured 300 seats in
> the 2009 general elections to become the ruling party. In reality, though,
> the DPJ is little more than a political party that attracts the critical
> "anti-LDP crowd," and the more seats it has gained, the weaker its party
> unity has become, with numerous intra-party disputes breaking out over
> personnel and policies. Prime Minister Noda is prepared to offer a general
> election campaign pledge on participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
> (TPP) Agreement, a stance that has generated strong opposition within the
> DPJ. In doing so, Noda is apparently seeking to rebuild the DPJ by
> encouraging Diet members locked into old political ways and conservative
> policies to leave the party and bringing in members abiding by the party
> line, even if their overall numbers decline somewhat. While the DPJ?s seat
> count might fall substantially in the next general elections, the party's
> "blunting course " could over the medium to long term garner public
> support and allow the party to grow again and form a new government.
>
> Voting and tallying for the general elections are to take place on
> December 16. It is highly likely that the LDP will become the dominant
> party and return to power. Having lost its majority in the House of
> Councilors, it will probably have to form a coalition with other parties
> to create a stable government even if it does gain a majority in the House
> of Representatives. The New Komeito might be a potent coalition partner,
> but in certain scenarios it could choose to team up in some way with the
> DPJ. The outcome of the elections will determine which parties will join
> up in a coalition.
>
> A new dimension to the upcoming general elections is the large number of
> LDP and DPJ defectors as well as prefectural governors who have created
> new political parties in the run-up to these elections. An all-time high
> of twelve parties have fielded candidates. This upsurge in the number of
> political parties can be attributed to the fact that, over the past few
> years, defectors from the LDP and DPJ have thrown their support behind
> well-known governors or other figures and formed new political parties to
> ensure their own political survival. This has been made possible by an
> electoral system featuring a combination of single-seat constituencies and
> proportional representation. While candidates from minor parties might
> find it nearly impossible to defeat DPJ or LDP rivals in single-seat
> constituencies, they do stand a chance at winning in
> proportional-representation constituencies. Hence, many political parties
> have been created in the hope of scoring victories in
> proportional-representation constituencies. These minor parties are
> running election campaigns focused solely on specific policies popular
> with the public -- opposing consumption tax hikes or advocating a no-nuke
> energy policy, for instance-- and they offer no overarching platform for
> national governance as a whole. In other words, the minor parties
> springing up one after the other display a distinctly "electoral mutual
> aid society" character in seeking to gain seats despite their small size,
> and it seems unlikely that they will win many seats.
>
> It might be hoped that Japanese politics will settle down after the
> general elections and allow the focus to swing from politics to policy,
> but the situation is not so simple. In 2013, there are House of Councilors
> elections scheduled in July, and Diet debates among the various parties
> will no doubt heat up as these elections draw closer. A ready policy
> consensus would only serve to benefit the ruling party, so widespread and
> unproductive dickering is an undeniable possibility. In other words, Japan
> has a political calendar that will make it difficult to avoid introverted
> political wrangling even after the general elections.
>
> 2013 will be an important year for the international community, one in
> which new administrations will take office in certain key countries --
> including the US, China, and South Korea -- and pursue their own foreign
> policies. Wrangling over the rise of China in particular is expected to
> intensify within the international community. As it seeks to secure its
> development as a maritime nation, China will no doubt pursue assertive and
> even aggressive policies not just on its territorial issues with Japan but
> on numerous other political, economic and military matters. The US in
> making its pivot toward Asia will counter China through economic and
> military policy. The US can also be expected to request TPP participation
> and greater security cooperation from Japan.
>
> Whether the Japanese government will be able in 2013 to respond flexibly
> to such developments in the international community is an important
> concern. Japan?s presence in the international community can likely be
> restored if an effectively functioning coalition government can actively
> address domestic and foreign policy issues. On the other hand, if a new
> administration is swayed by domestic politics because of an unstable base,
> it will not have much leeway to devote effort to foreign affairs. In this
> sense, the December general elections are of significance for both Japan
> and for the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.
>
>
> ****************
> AJISS-Commentary is an occasional op-ed type publication of The
> Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies (AJISS) consisting
> of three leading Japanese think tanks: Institute for International Policy
> Studies (IIPS), The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and
> Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS).
>
>
http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary/
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