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Subject: H-ASIA: REVIEW Tovy on Waite, _The End of the First Indochina War:
A Global History_
> H-ASIA
> December 4, 2012
>
> Book Review (orig. pub. H-War) by Tal Tovy on James Waite, _The End of the
> First Indochina War: A Global History_
>
> (x-post H-Review)
> ***********************************************************************
> From: H-Net Staff <
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>
> James Waite. The End of the First Indochina War: A Global History.
> New York Routledge, 2012. 310 pp. $125.00 (cloth), ISBN
> 978-0-415-88684-0.
>
> Reviewed by Tal Tovy (Bar Ilan University)
> Published on H-War (December, 2012)
> Commissioned by Margaret Sankey
>
> Tovy on Waite
>
> During the thirty years since the end of the Second World War, three
> wars were waged in Vietnam. The first was between the forces of the
> Viet Minh against France, which ended with the agreement signed in
> Geneva in July 1954. The second war was between the United States
> together with South Vietnam against North Vietnam and the communist
> guerrillas in the south, the Viet Cong. This war also ended with a
> peace agreement signed in Paris in January 1973. Almost immediately
> after the end of this second war, a third war began between North and
> South Vietnam which ended in the complete reunification of Vietnam
> after the North Vietnamese forces defeated the South Vietnamese
> forces. This means that the third war ended in a decisive military
> victory that was directly translated into a political achievement. We
> may then claim that from a historical perspective, the two agreements
> that were signed did not bring stability to Southeast Asia.
>
> The first war in Vietnam began as an attempt by the French to regain
> control over its empire as well as to restore its image which had
> suffered humiliation through the rapid German conquest and by the
> collaboration of many Frenchmen with the Nazi regime. The events in
> Vietnam occurred in two parallel processes. The first was the
> stirring of strong national emotions of the Vietnamese under the
> leadership of Ho Chi Minh. This process reached its peak with the
> declaration by Ho Chi Minh of the independence of Vietnam (September
> 1945). In spite of the attempts to find a solution for Vietnamese
> nationalism, France was not prepared for the total relinquishing of
> its imperialist control over Indochina, and open warfare began at the
> end of 1946. The second process was the deterioration in the
> relations between the two superpowers and the outbreak of the Cold
> War. This means that from its very inception the war in Vietnam
> became a global event that involved both superpowers in one way or
> another and several other countries even outside the geographical
> sphere of Southeast Asia.
>
> The emphasis in the book by James Waite is on the last year and a
> half of the French-Vietnamese war, which is done through a careful
> analysis of documents and other primary sources, mainly Western ones.
> This provides a wider perspective of the political processes that led
> to the end of the war, with a certain stress laid on French policy.
> Although Waite does not make use of primary sources from the archives
> of the various communist countries, especially of the central
> players, he makes up for this by a critical analysis of the extensive
> secondary material on the subject.
>
> The main claim made by Waite is that the first war in Vietnam should
> be regarded as an important event in the context of the Cold War, one
> that had a decisive influence on world politics. In order to prove
> his contention, Waite divides his book into three parts, with each
> part exemplifying the fact that the war was an important
> international event which defined to a great extent, as did the
> Korean War, the political realities that had been created after the
> Second World War. The first part merges the military history with the
> political history of the war, and deals with the battle in Dien Bien
> Phu and the political maneuverings ahead of the international
> conference that would conclude the war. The second part, mainly
> diplomatic, examines the negotiations that were conducted in Geneva
> against the background of the Viet Minh victory in Dien Bien Phu. The
> third part, which Waite calls "The Global Legacy," constitutes a kind
> of introduction to an understanding of the intensified and direct
> intervention by the United States in Southeast Asia. This was
> because, as he claims, "the Geneva Accords ... failed to establish an
> enduring peace in Indochina" (p. 1).
>
> As said above, the main historical perspective in this study is to
> examine French policy, which at first regarded the confrontation in
> Vietnam as just another of the colonial wars France had encountered
> during the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
> century. During these years, the French took the aggressive
> initiative, and French forces conquered territories under Viet Minh
> control, destroying many food and ammunition storage centers. But in
> the long run, they did not achieve their operational goals. The
> leaders of the Viet Minh were not caught, and the main communist
> forces were not defeated. When the French retreated to their bases,
> the Viet Minh regained control over the vacated areas. Even though it
> was evident that the Viet Minh were still incapable of direct
> confrontation with the firepower and mobility of the French army, it
> was also clear that the lack of manpower would prevent France from
> maintaining its rule over the territories under Viet Minh control.
>
> The strategic realities in Vietnam changed dramatically at the end of
> 1949 and in the first half of 1950, by which time the war in Vietnam
> had clearly become an international issue. The victory of the
> communists in China (October 1949) allowed China to supply military
> and technical assistance to the Viet Minh, besides which Viet Minh
> units crossed the border and South China became a refuge area in
> which they could train and renew their strength. This military
> assistance was also accompanied by diplomatic support. On January 18,
> 1950, China recognized the People's Republic of Vietnam. This
> recognition also led the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern
> Europe to recognize Vietnam (January 30).
>
> The conversion of China into a communist state and the support of the
> communist powers for the People's Republic of Vietnam changed the
> policy of the United States towards the Indochina conflict in a
> dramatic manner. This change of policy was a continuation of the
> deteriorating relations among the powers over issues relating to
> Europe, especially after the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia and
> the siege of Berlin. About three weeks after China recognized the
> People's Republic of Vietnam, the United States recognized the
> artificial political entity imposed by France, the State of Vietnam.
> This recognition was at first accompanied by massive U.S. economic
> and military assistance to France. In June 1950 the Korean War broke
> out, which was perceived by the American government as instigated by
> the desire of the Soviet Union, with the help of its allegiant
> supporters in Southeast Asia, to extend the sphere of its control and
> influence. The war in Indochina was now perceived as a struggle
> closely connected with the Cold War, with France standing with the
> United States to confront communist aggression.
>
> The next stage, which is perhaps an even greater indication of the
> international character of the war, was the military and diplomatic
> measures that occurred during the final stages of the war, especially
> in the defeat of the French in Dien Bien Phu. This stage began with
> the battle around the village of Dien Bien Phu. On November 20, 1953,
> about two thousand French paratroopers landed near the village,
> quickly destroyed the stationed forces of the Viet Minh, and began to
> build a defense system. The Viet Minh forces under the command of
> General Vo Nguyen Giap, had no choice but to respond to the
> challenge. The forces were exhausted, there was a lack of food, and
> the morale of the recruits was low. There is no doubt that extreme
> political pressure was exerted on Giap to eliminate the French
> stronghold that had been erected deep within the area under Viet Minh
> control. This was because an international conference was supposed to
> open in April 1954 in Geneva, in which it was planned to raise the
> many political issues relating to East Asia, including Korea and the
> confrontations in Indochina. Ho Chi Minh wanted to achieve an
> important military victory that could be translated into diplomatic
> advantage during the discussions in Geneva.
>
> The battle over Dien Bien Phu, which began officially on March 13,
> 1954, is also important for the American intervention in Vietnam.
> During the course of the fighting, many discussions were held between
> the senior French command and the heads of the American army over the
> possibility that the United States would intervene openly in the
> battle in order to save the French forces in Dien Bien Phu and
> restore the attack initiative to France (Operation Vulture).
> President Eisenhower was committed to the policy of containment that
> had been formulated by his predecessor, President Harry Truman. The
> basic essentials of the Truman Doctrine determined that the United
> States should use all the means at its disposal, including military
> force, to block communist aspirations from spreading beyond the areas
> it had gained at the end of the Second World War. The practical
> aspect of this policy was well exemplified in the Korean War. In an
> interview given by Eisenhower in April 1954, the president said that
> if Vietnam fell into communist hands, then the rest of the countries
> in Southeast Asia and even beyond them would fall like dominoes.
> Although at first he had supported direct American intervention,
> Eisenhower also wanted the participation of Britain. But the British
> refused and asserted that a diplomatic solution should be sought in
> the framework of the conference that was to be held in Geneva. At the
> end of intensive discussions, the United States decided to increase
> its military assistance to France but not to intervene directly. Thus
> Eisenhower became the first president who had to decide about the
> possible direct intervention by the United States in Vietnam. But his
> decision against sending American forces only postponed this
> intervention by a decade.
>
> The final stage of the battle began on April 29 around the airport.
> On May 4 the senior command realized that the hope for victory was
> lost. The last attack was launched on May 6, and a day later the
> remaining French soldiers surrendered. It is a mistake to suppose
> that the French army was beaten by a handful of guerrilla fighters.
> In the two years before the battle, Giap had built up a regular army
> equipped with heavy armaments and a supporting logistical system. The
> Battle of Dien Bien Phu was therefore one that was held between two
> regular armies. Moreover, the defeat did not change the strategic
> situation in Indochina. The French continued to control the urban
> centers and the deltas, and their hold over South Vietnam and
> Cambodia did not collapse. However, the defeat marked a political
> death blow to French colonialism in Asia and assisted in ending the
> war since it provided a motive for those who opposed French colonial
> policy in general and war in particular to reach an honorable
> political arrangement. The means to do this was the international
> conference that had opened in Geneva on April 26, about two weeks
> before the surrender of the French troops stationed in Dien Bien Phu.
>
> At the Geneva Conference, other issues relating to East Asia were
> discussed, including the issue of Korea. The countries that
> participated in this conference were the United States, the Soviet
> Union, China, Britain, and France. Representatives also arrived from
> the two Vietnamese states. The American delegate to the conference,
> secretary of state John Dulles, decided to pull the United States out
> of the talks for two reasons. The first was that he had already
> understood at the beginning of the discussions that no agreement
> would be formulated to which the United States could agree. The
> second was the reluctance to side at the same table with the Chinese
> delegate since at that time the United States had not yet recognized
> communist China as a legitimate political entity representative of
> the Chinese people. Thus only the lowest rank of American
> representatives remained as mere observers to report the developments
> of the discussion to the State Department. We may then regard the
> conference at Geneva, like the talks that ended the war in Korea, as
> a central event that shaped the initial years of the Cold War.
>
> The North Vietnamese representatives wanted the establishment of a
> unified Vietnam in order to give political expression to their
> military victories. But the Chinese and Soviet representatives
> actually supported the French proposal for a temporary division of
> Vietnam along the 17th parallel. The reason for this was that China
> and the Soviet Union were afraid that this demand for unification
> would also be made by North Korea and East Germany, and thus the
> communists would lose their control over these countries. At the end
> of long discussions the Geneva Agreement was signed on July 21, 1954,
> which redefined the political configuration of Indochina. It was
> decided to establish Laos and Cambodia as independent countries. The
> most important decision was the division of Vietnam into two states
> and the creation of a demilitarized zone of six kilometers with the
> aim of avoiding military clashes that might lead to the escalation of
> warfare. It was also decided that the future of Vietnam as an
> independent and unified country would determined by a referendum that
> would be held in July 1956. The Vietnamese people would then decide
> whether it wanted to be under the rule of the Communist Party or
> under the rule of Emperor Bao Dai.
>
> To supervise the application of the agreement a committee was
> appointed composed from members from a Western state, Canada; a
> communist state, Poland; and a nonaligned country, India. The
> representatives of the Viet Minh left Geneva in disappointment
> because they were unable to convert their military successes into
> political ones. Perhaps this fact may prove that despite the
> important victory in Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh did not achieve a
> decisive victory and that the political arrangement which was forced
> upon them expressed the wish of France to end the war but did not
> express decisive military defeat. The very fact that France remained
> in control in the south and in the urban centers denied full victory
> to the Viet Minh and helped France to create a political system that
> reflected the strategic realities of the summer of 1954.
>
> Waite examines the first war in Vietnam mainly through the prism of
> the Cold War, but there were in fact three wars in Indochina. It
> began as an anticolonial struggle or war for national liberation.
> When the State of Vietnam was established by France, the war took on
> another dimension and can be defined as a civil war. With the
> outbreak of the Korean War and the beginning of United States
> intervention on the side of France, the war in Indochina became part
> of the broad and general framework of the Cold War. The United States
> ignored or was not able to understand the three-fold nature of the
> conflict. Moreover, in 1954 it was already faced with another example
> of a war that contained three conflicts--the Korean War.
>
> The war in Korea broke out because of the patriotic aspirations of
> the northern leader Kim Il Sung to bring about the national
> unification of Korea. Between the years 1949-50, a confrontation
> occurred between the two Koreas which can be defined as a civil war
> which exploded in full force with the massive invasion by the North
> in June 1950. At the start of United States intervention in the war
> and the intervention of China (November 1950) there was no doubt
> among the American policymakers that the Korean War was caused by
> communist aggression directed by Moscow, and that this was the first
> hot war in the framework of the Cold War. It may be said that already
> in 1947 American foreign and defense policy defined communism as the
> main and perhaps exclusive enemy of the free world. Therefore, any
> popular uprising was marked by the United States as instigated by the
> Soviet Union. This line of thought would steer American foreign
> policy towards Vietnam until the end of 1968.
>
> The book under review can be placed within a number of historical
> frameworks. The first is the very fact that it is an additional
> historical work on the first war in Vietnam and an introduction to
> the second one, the stage of American intervention, which is better
> known. It is also a book about the foreign and internal policy of
> France after the Second World War and a book on the origins of the
> Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This is also an important work for
> the understanding of global history after the Second World War.
> Through the war in Vietnam as a test case, we may learn about the
> relations among the powers and the complex interrelations within
> every coalition under the direction of the superpowers. The book
> therefore constitutes another example of the fact that the communist
> bloc was not monolithic, and that in spite of Soviet seniority, we
> can already find at this stage the roots of the ideological and
> political dispute between the Soviet Union and China.
>
> Another historical framework incorporates the war as an important
> event in the period after the Second World War, with an emphasis on
> it as a means for understanding the spread and escalation of the Cold
> War. The value of the book lies in providing a balanced analysis
> which does not place exclusive blame on the United States for
> involving Indochina in the Cold War. It also analyzes the creation of
> a communist coalition which thus converted the antiolonial struggle
> into a part of the Cold War. Quite simply, it should be claimed that
> the two processes influenced and were influenced by each other, and
> that it is not possible to determine which was the more important
> one, and certainly not during the first two decades after the Second
> World War. The last part of the book which deals with the first two
> years after the signing of the Geneva Agreement, describes with great
> care the problematic merging of the two historical processes.
>
> We therefore have before us a book that departs from the borderlines
> of analyzing a single event and is instead a study that merges within
> it a number of historical issues that clarify their importance during
> the reading process. The book is worth reading by all those who are
> engaged in global political history after the Second World War and
> the beginning of the Cold War. It is also an important contribution
> as an introduction to the beginnings of American intervention in
> Vietnam as the roots of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. The book may
> serve as a valuable basis for a number of comparative studies,
> especially the comparative evaluation of the discussions that were
> held in Geneva and the exhaustive ones that were conducted in
> Panmunjom at the end of the Korean War, and a comparison between
> Geneva of 1954 and Paris of 1972-73.
>
> As already mentioned above, the book ends with a discussion of the
> events that occurred through 1956, the year in which the people of
> Vietnam were supposed to decide its fate. This referendum never took
> place, and thus the chessboard was rearranged for the next
> confrontation--the second war in Vietnam, or simply, the Vietnam War.
>
> Citation: Tal Tovy. Review of Waite, James, _The End of the First
> Indochina War: A Global History_. H-War, H-Net Reviews. December,
> 2012.
> URL:
https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=36874
>
> This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
> Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
> License.
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